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Abstract 
In this paper, we present a case study of two major consumer-to-consumer 
marketplaces that adopt different platform governance strategies and examine how 
the users of each marketplace trust other users and the marketplace platforms. Our 
study was conducted in two steps: qualitative and quantitative research. As a first 
step, we conducted interviews with the directors of the two platforms. As the second 
step, we conducted user survey to assess the user perception of platform governance 
strategies.  The preliminary finding from our interview with the operators of two 
major C2C marketplaces shows that the both operators acknowledge an effective 
governance system as the key factor of success, but adopt different approaches to 
ensure effectiveness. Two different strategies for platform governance are adopted: 
proactive and reactive. The preliminary finding from our user survey indicates that 
users perceive a reactive strategy as more effective compared to a proactive 
strategy.  
Keywords:  C2C platform, platform governance, auction fraud, trust 
 
Introduction 
Online marketplaces are broadly categorized into two categories: business-to-business (B2B) 
marketplace and consumer-to-business (B2C) or consumer-to-consumer (C2C) marketplace (Pavlou 
and Gefen 2004). A business-to-business marketplace facilitates exchange among organizations. The 
second category facilitates transactions involving consumers. This paper focuses on the latter category, 
especially the C2C marketplace. 
A recent prominent trend in the ICT environment is the emergence and rapid growth of C2C platforms, 
which according to the Ministry of Trade, Economy and Industry of Japan, has an estimated market 
size of 1 trillion Japanese yen (approximately 8.8 billion USD). The C2C marketplace can be 
considered as a form of multi-sided platform, which comprise technologies, products, or services that 
create value primarily by enabling direct interactions between two or more customers or participant 
groups (Hagiu 2014). In the case of a C2C marketplace, the platform enables users to sell and buy 
products.  
C2C transactions are different from B2C transactions in various ways, and require new models of 
operation (Jones and Leonard 2008, Hennig-Thurau et al. 2010). First, the degree of seller 
uncertainty is considerably larger in C2C transactions. According to Dimoka et al. (2012), seller 
uncertainty is defined as the buyer’s difficulty in assessing the seller’s true characteristics and 
predicting whether the seller will act opportunistically. The quantity and quality of the information 
regarding sellers are limited in a C2C platform, whereas in a B2C platform, the sellers provide full 
information of their companies, products, and services. In some cases, platforms allow users to use a 
nickname and stay anonymous during the transaction process. The lack of information on users raises 
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the uncertainty and risk of the transaction for both sellers and buyers. The second difference is the 
continuity of the buyer–seller relationship. Given that the sellers in a C2C marketplace are consumers 
who became retailers themselves, they are not professional sellers (Hennig-Thurau et al. 2010). This 
means that sellers are “open” for business only when they want to do so. Furthermore, these amateur 
sellers rarely have an inventory of their products. Given that the product sold in C2C transactions are 
often secondhand, the buyer–seller relationship tends to end in one transaction. In summary, C2C 
transactions are highly uncertain compared to B2C transactions, thus emphasizing the importance of 
platform governance. Chua and Wareham (2004) and Gregg and Scott (2006) list and describe 
internet auction fraud types. Table 1 summarizes the types of internet auction fraud discussed in their 
research. 
 
Shilling Seller bids on own auction to drive up an item’s price. 
Bid shielding/multiple bidding Auction buyer places multiple bids using different identities, 
withdraws high bids subsequently, and purchases an item at a low 
bid. 
Misrepresentation  Seller deceives buyer about the true value of an item. 
Fee stacking Seller adds hidden charges to the item’s price after the auction ends. 
Failure to ship Seller never sends the goods. 
Failure to pay Buyer never sends the money. 
Reproductions and counterfeit Seller advertises counterfeit goods as the real thing. 
Triangulation/fencing Seller uses stolen credit to buy from online merchant, and resells the 
item at an auction. 
Buy and switch Buyer receives merchandise, but switches original merchandise with 
inferior merchandise before refusing and returning it. 
Loss or damage claims Buyer claims the item was damaged and disposed of, and requests 
money back. 
Shell Auction Seller sets up an auction solely to obtain names and credit cards. 
Table 1. Types of Internet Auction Fraud. 
 
The main revenue of C2C platforms is the transaction fee. The platform charges a certain percentage 
of the closing price from both sides, i.e., the seller and the buyer. In most cases, a user can become a 
member of a C2C marketplace free of charge. The listing of products is also often free of charge. C2C 
platforms need to attract both buyers and sellers and increase the number of transactions to be 
successful. These platforms exhibit two types of network effects: a same-side effect and a cross-side 
effect (Eisenmann et al. 2006). Given that the cross-side effect works strongly in the C2C marketplace, 
increasing the number of sellers is valuable for buyers, and vice versa. 
One of the key factors that attract users and increase transaction is to build trust in the platform 
(Gefen, Karahannna, and Straub 2003). In previous research, trust has a number of definitions. In 
this paper, we use the definition by Rousseau et al. (1998) which state that trust is “a psychological 
state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations of the intentions 
or behaviors of another.” Many researches have focused on the relationship between trust and the 
intention of the transaction on the internet (McKnight et al. 2002; Fogg et al. 2003; Gefen et al. 2003; 
Xiao and Benbasat 2003). In C2C e-commerce, trust must be established by both buyers and sellers 
(Jones and Leonard 2008). As Pavlou and Gefen (2004) claim, the critical service that online 
marketplaces provide is the creation of trust in the marketplace and reduction of perceived risk from it. 
The authors believe that the key to this critical service is the platform governance strategy, since this 
component of the platform directly solves problems regarding transaction uncertainty and promotes 
user trust on the sellers and the platform.  
Hagiu (2014) explains the strategic decisions for a multisided platform, and states that governance 
rules are one of the four fundamental strategic decisions. This research claims that the rules 
regulating access to the platform and rules regulating interactions on the platform are the two major 
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categories of governance. While the governance rules proposed by Hagiu (2014) focus on the 
regulations, the scope of governance strategy can include broader dimensions such as feedback 
mechanisms and customer support processes, buyer guarantee systems, and escrow service.  
The motivation for our research is to identify an effective platform governance strategy for C2C 
marketplaces. Our work aims to answer these questions:  What types of governance strategies are 
adopted by the operators of C2C platforms? What type of governance is perceived to be effective by 
the users in C2C marketplaces? To achieve our goal, we present a case of two major C2C marketplaces 
that adopt different platform governance strategies, and examine how the users of each marketplace 
trust other users and the platform operated in the marketplace. 
The rest of the paper is organized is follows. First, we describe the two different platform governance 
strategies, namely proactive and reactive strategies. Then, we present the case study of two major C2C 
marketplaces in Japan, namely Mercari and Yahoo! Auctions, and the preliminary findings from our 
user survey. Finally, conclusions are drawn and future research directions are identified. 
Platform Governance Strategies for C2C Marketplaces 
Prior research suggests that a safe and honest transaction environment is crucial to gain user trust and 
to facilitate increasing number of C2C marketplace transactions. The key to increase the revenue is to 
design the governance system in such a way that it promotes trust between the buyer and the seller as 
well as between the users and the platform. The fundamental means to achieve trust is the governance 
strategy that can be of two basic types: proactive and reactive strategies. In this paper, a proactive 
strategy is defined as a platform governance strategy that preempts any problems in the marketplace 
beforehand so that the users do not have to call customer support in the first place. The second 
strategy is a reactive strategy that invests in a customer support center to provide full support when a 
problem arises.  
Grazioli and Jarvenpaa (2003) claim that to reduce the occurrence of internet deception, a 
comprehensive strategy must include consideration of deterrence, prevention, and detection. We 
labeled such strategy as “proactive strategy.” Some aspects of a proactive strategy are the identity 
authentication of the seller, the determination of seller reputation, illegal/inappropriate listing 
detection, and out-of-the-platform transaction detection. Having systems for authenticating user 
identity and determining seller reputation in place will make it difficult for malicious sellers to settle 
transactions in the platform. Seller reputation systems help establish a seller’s reputation (Dellarocas 
2003). Buyers assess the sellers’ remarks before the transaction and the feedback mechanism is useful 
to create price premiums for trustworthy sellers as returns to their reputation (Pavlou and Dimoka 
2006). Illegal/inappropriate listing detection is often realized using text mining and machine learning 
techniques. An out-of-the-platform transaction is the act of finding a seller or buyer in the platform 
and settling the transaction outside the platform to avoid the payment of transaction fee. Given that 
this conduct would decrease the revenue of the platform, detecting and preempting out-of-the-
platform transactions would be crucial for the platforms.  
Examples of the means of reactive strategy include a mutual rating system for buyers and sellers, a 
customer support center, and a buyer guarantee system. Pavlou and Gefen (2004) focus on 
institutional mechanisms such as feedback features, escrow services, and credit card guarantees that 
are implemented or created by a third party to create conditions that will facilitate successful 
transactions. They evaluated the perceived effectiveness of such mechanisms. Giving a negative rating 
on a malicious buyer or seller is an effective action when problems are encountered on the platform.  
The customer support center is the key to solving any problems arising during the process of C2C 
transactions. Finally, the buyer guarantee system could solve problems such as a buyer not receiving a 
product or receiving a fraudulent product.  
Srinivasan et al. (2002) investigate the antecedents and consequences of customer loyalty in the 
online B2C context. They argue that 8Cs, namely customization, contact interactivity, care, 
community, convenience, cultivation, choice, and character impact e-loyalty. A customer support 
center is related to two of these factors: contact interactivity and care. In the research, contact 
interactivity is operationally defined as the availability and effectiveness of customer support tools on 
the website, and the degree to which two-way communication with a customer is facilitated. Care is 
important since a high level of care exercised by a company (in our case, the operator of the platform) 
to minimize disruptions in customer service will lead to high e-loyalty. Although the context of the 
research is B2C platforms, the authors’ argument applies to our interest as the relationship between 
the platform operator and the user can be considered as a B2C relationship. 
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Both proactive and reactive means of platform governance are often installed in C2C platforms. We 
aim to determine which strategy is considered important by the operator of the platforms, and which 
strategy is perceived to be more effective by the users of the platforms. In the following section, we 
discuss the case of two major C2C marketplaces in Japan to describe the different platform 
governance strategies. 
Case Study 
We present here the case study of Mercari and Yahoo! Auctions. The reason for selecting these two 
studies is as follows. First, Yahoo! Auctions is the oldest and largest C2C marketplace in Japan, and it 
is unreasonable to analyze and discuss a C2C marketplace without this marketplace in our context. 
Second, Mercari is one of the largest smartphone-based C2C marketplaces. As internet users spend 
more time on smartphones and less time on PCs, it is crucial to include a mobile-based C2C 
marketplace to address the practical problems in today’s business environment. According to Nielsen, 
the number of users who accessed C2C marketplaces in 2014 was 15.2 million via PCs and 15.5 million 
via smartphones. In 2016, the number of users who accessed C2C marketplaces via PC decreased to 
11.5 million users, whereas the same number for smartphone-based access increased to 26.6 million. 
The average number of access per user is much higher for smartphone users (32 accesses per month) 
compared to PC access users (11 accesses per month). This indicates that users accessing C2C 
marketplaces are shifting from PCs to smartphones, and Mercari captures this emerging market. In 
sum, these two services boast the largest user base among the C2C marketplaces in Japan, and provide 
us great opportunity to gain insight into this topic. 
Mercari 
Mercari Inc. was established in February 2013 by Shintaro Yamada in Japan. The company released a 
free C2C resale shopping app, Mercari (iOS and Android) in November 2013. A month after the 
release, the number of downloads reached 1 million. Mercari quickly gained a large userbase that 
reached 3 million in May 2014, 5 million in September 2014, and 10 million in January 2015. One of 
the reasons for this drastic growth in the number of users is the use of TV commercials. As of 
December 2016, the number of downloads reached 35 million. 
Their free mobile app allows sellers to offer a wide variety of items, such as apparel, accessories, and 
games (Figure 1). This app can be considered as a two-sided platform consisting of buyers and sellers. 
The easy-to-use and intuitive interface of the app allows buyers and sellers easy, frictionless 
transaction. The user can become a seller by simply uploading the photo of the product along with a 
few details. According to Mercari, the listing process takes approximately three minutes and it is free 
of charge. 
 
 
Source: www.mercari.com 
Figure 1. Screenshot of a Mercari transaction. 
 
Furthermore, Mercari offers easy shipping experience. The app has a built-in shipping feature so that 
the user can print the label and simply drop it in the mailbox. When the transaction is complete, the 
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buyer pays the price of the product and the commission for the operator. Mercari takes 10% 
transaction fee from the seller as well. 
For platform governance, the company employs various tactics. To protect the user, the company 
provides an escrow service that holds the payment until the buyer confirms receipt of the purchased 
product. It also has a buyer guarantee system that covers the cost of purchase if the user does not 
receive the product. To maintain a healthy accountable platform, the company uses a 3-point scale 
mutual rating system (good/normal/bad) for both buyers and sellers. 
Yahoo! Auctions 
Yahoo! Auctions was launched in 1999 as an auction service of Yahoo! Japan and is one of the oldest 
and largest C2C platforms in Japan. To use the service, the user needs to have a Yahoo! Japan ID. 
Given that Yahoo! Japan has a large customer base, the users and the number of listings increase 
steadily. 
A user can list a product by becoming a Yahoo! Premium member with a monthly membership fee of 
462 JPY. A user can become a bidder free of charge, but is required to prove his/her identity when 
bidding. It is an open ascending price auction; therefore, the transaction does not close immediately. 
The company takes 8.64% of the auction price as the transaction fee. Figure 2 is the screen shot of the 
web page, which has a 5-point scale user rating system. 
Yahoo! Auctions started as a web service, but Yahoo! Japan has adapted to the recent trend of users 
accessing the internet through smartphones by offering smartphone apps. Yahoo! continues to 
upgrade its C2C commerce service and has launched a nonauction-style C2C e-commerce in February 
2017. It is a service offered to the users of PCs and smartphones, and unlike the existing auction 
service, a seller can list an item without becoming a Yahoo! Premium member. In addition, a seller 
determines the price of the item at once unlike in ascending auctions.  
Table 2 summarizes the features of the two platforms. Mercari and Yahoo! Auctions are 
fundamentally different given that although Yahoo! Auctions started as a nonauction-style service 
recently, it has established its position as an auction platform whereas Mercari is not. However, we 
proceed to compare these two services for three reasons. First, although they are different with regard 
to the transaction process, they both belong to the category of C2C marketplace. The second reason is 
user perception. Both are in the same consideration set when users want to buy or sell the product to 
other users online. The third reason is the operator’s perception. Through the interview, we found that 
the two operators see each other as a competitor. Finally, the recent new service offered by Yahoo! 
Auctions is very similar to Mercari in terms of the price determination process and devices used for 
access. 
 
 
Figure 2. Screenshot of a Yahoo! Auctions transaction. 
 
To understand the two distinctive C2C marketplaces in Japan, we interviewed the directors of both 
services. The interview with the director of Mercari was conducted in June 2016, and the interview of 
the manager of Yahoo! Auctions was conducted in September 2016. Through our interviews, we found 
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that both services acknowledge trust as the key factor of success and adopt different approaches to 
secure the governance structure in the marketplace. 
Table 3 summarizes the list of means of the governance system in the two marketplaces. As described 
in the previous section, the six items in the first column of the table are considered as the means of a 
proactive strategy, and the last three items can be labeled as the means of a reactive strategy. 
Through the interview, we found that Mercari adopts a reactive strategy because the company invests 
heavily in customer support, and Yahoo! Auctions adopts a proactive strategy because the company 
place emphasis on preempting problems in the marketplace. 
 
 Mercari Yahoo! Auctions 
 (auction style) 
Yahoo! Auctions 
(flea market style) 
Price Determined by seller at 
once 
Ascending Determined by seller at 
once 
Fee 10% transaction fee 
from seller 
Monthly membership fee, 
transaction fee from seller 
transaction fee from 
seller (10% for 
nonmember, 8.64% for 
premium member) 
Duration of 
listing 
Not determined 7 days (can be extended 3 
times) 
7 days  
Payment e-payment system Exclusive payment system, 
bank transfer, postal transfer 
Exclusive payment 
system 
Payment timing After the arrival and 
inspection of the 
product 
After the arrival and 
inspection of the product 
After the arrival and 
inspection of the 
product 
Service Offering Mobile App, web Mobile app, web  Mobile app, web 
Table 2. Basic features of Mercari and Yahoo! Auctions.  
 
 Mercari Yahoo! 
Auction 
Past literature 
Identity authentication of seller  ✓✓ Suh and Han (2003), 
Reputation system for seller ✓ ✓✓ Gregg and Scott (2006), 
Pavlou and Gefen (2004), 
Ba and Pavlou (2002) 
Illegal/inappropriate listing 
detection 
✓✓ ✓✓ Chiu et al. (2011) 
Text mining ✓✓ ✓✓ Pavlou and Dimoka (2006) 
Fraud detection using machine 
learning 
✓✓  Chiu et al. (2011) 
Detection of out-of-the platform 
transaction 
✓✓ ✓  
Mutual rating system for buyer 
and seller 
✓✓ ✓✓ Pavlou and Gefen (2004) 
Customer support  ✓✓ ✓ Srinivasan et al. (2002) 
Buyer guarantee ✓✓ ✓ Pavlou and Gefen (2004) 
✓: measures partly taken; ✓✓:  measures taken already. 
Table 3. Governance system features of Mercari and Yahoo! Auctions. 
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User Survey 
Data Collection 
In this section, we describe the result of our preliminary survey of the users of C2C platforms. Using 
the panel data of an online research company, we screened the panel members who had used Mercari 
or Yahoo! Auctions in the past three months. We obtained 455 user samples who responded that she 
used Mercari, and 740 samples who responded that she used Yahoo! Auctions, and 100 samples who 
responded that she used both services. Excluding the users who use both, we randomly selected 155 
samples from Mercari users and Yahoo! Auctions users, and conducted the user survey in October 
2016. 
The respondents were asked about the usage of the platform such as the usage frequency, types of 
usage (mainly to buy item/mainly to sell item/use for both buying and selling), category of products 
that they sell/buy, price of the product that they sell /buy, length of customer history, and 
demographic information such as age and sex. The respondents were also asked about the degree of 
trust on the seller/buyer and platform, and the reason for the trust. Finally, the respondents answered 
questions on the disposition to trust. The demographics of the users of two services were very different.  
Mercari users were 86.5% female, whereas that of Yahoo! Auctions users were 34.8%. Most of the 
Mercari users were in their twenties and thirties (72.2%), and the users of Yahoo! Auctions were 
mostly in their forties and fifties (54.8%). 
Results 
First, we examined the disposition to trust by following the previous research on C2C platforms 
(McKnight et al. 1998, McKnight et al. 2002). To examine the disposition to trust, we used the 
uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) score (Hofsted 1980). The UAI expresses the degree to which the 
members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. We considered that a high 
UAI score indicates a risk-averse user, and thus less disposition to trust. The mean rank of the UAI for 
Mercari users was 163.45 and that for Yahoo! Auctions users was 147.55. No statistical difference was 
found in the two groups (Mann–Whitney U-test; z = –1.578, p = 0.115 two-sided). The degree of 
disposition to trust of the users of Mercari and Yahoo! Auctions is not statistically different. 
Second, we investigated which platform governance strategy is perceived to be effective by the users. 
In the survey, the respondents were asked to “select the effective means of solving a problem.” Figure 
3 summarizes the results. As shown in Figure 3, the top two were “Guarantee system” and “Customer 
support via telephone.” This indicates that reactive rather than proactive means of platform 
governance is considered effective by users of both marketplaces, and there was no difference in the 
two groups. 
 
 
Figure 3. Effective means for governance in C2C marketplace (MA). 
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Third, we investigated the structure of trust. In the survey, we asked the respondents the reason why a 
user trusted a buyer/seller. The result, shown in Figure 4, indicates that the top reason that makes a 
user trust a buyer/seller is the seller’s reputation (67.1% for Mercari users and 64.2% for Yahoo! 
Auctions user). Consistent with the past research, a rating system of the seller is an effective means of 
building trust in the C2C marketplace. One of the interesting findings of this survey is that the reason 
of trust is different for the two platforms. Mercari users trust the buyer/seller because they trust the 
platform operator because of the safe transaction environment they provide (46.15% for Mercari users 
and 33.11 for Yahoo! Auctions user). On the other hand, Yahoo! Auctions users trust the buyer/seller 
because of the attributes of buyers/sellers, i.e., the expertise in the product and C2C transactions 
(20.27% for Yahoo! Auctions users and 7.69% for Mercari users). The result of the chi-square test 
presented in Tables 4 and 5 shows the statistically significant difference of the two groups. 
 
 
Figure 4. Reason for trusting the buyer/seller (MA). 
 
Table 4. Response for “The seller has expertise on the product and C2C transactions.” 
 No Yes 
Mercari 132 11 
Yahoo! Auctions 118 30 
Total 250 41 
chi-square = 9.506, df = 1, p = 0.002 
 
Table 5. Response for “The platform provides a safe environment for the seller/buyer.” 
 No Yes 
Mercari 77 66 
Yahoo! Auctions 99 49 
Total 176 115 
chi-square = 5.179, df = 1, p = 0.023 
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Conclusion and Discussion  
In this paper, we focused on the platform governance strategy that helps build user trust in a C2C 
marketplace. Our findings through interviews indicate that both Mercari and Yahoo! Auctions see 
trust as a crucial component for the success of the C2C marketplace; Mercari emphasizes on a reactive 
strategy whereas Yahoo! Auctions focuses on a proactive strategy. The preliminary findings from our 
user survey indicate that users perceive a reactive strategy as more effective compared to a proactive 
strategy. Furthermore, the trust structure is different in the two marketplaces. Mercari users trust the 
platform operator, and Yahoo! Auction users trust the sellers rather than the platform operator. 
Most of the literature on online fraud focuses on proactive strategy, which includes deterrence, 
prevention, and detection of internet fraud. However, our findings suggest that users perceive reactive 
strategy as more effective in C2C marketplaces. One possible reason is the shift in the device users 
adopted for accessing the internet. Easy access from smartphones allows consumers with low internet 
literacy to come into C2C marketplaces.  These consumers are less likely to detect fraud by themselves, 
resulting in a higher risk of a user becoming a victim, and thus rely more on platform operators after 
experiencing online fraud. 
Future research would include further investigation into the trust structure in the C2C marketplace 
and the causal relationship between the degree of trustworthiness and success of the C2C marketplace. 
The result of the user survey suggests that the transaction frequency is higher for Mercari users. 
However, the average price of the transaction is higher for Yahoo! Auctions users. Studying the 
relationship among trust, transactions, and the success of C2C marketplaces will be our next step for a 
better understanding of the C2C marketplace. Another research opportunity is international 
comparison of trust level in C2C marketplaces. The Japanese consumer is considered to be one of the 
most risk-averse consumers in the world, and it would be valuable to ascertain if the result of our 
paper applies to other cultural contexts.  
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